Abstract. In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of the stability of cartels and mergers under oligopoly. We show that, although so far the industrial organization and the cooperative game-theoretic literature have proceeded somehow independently on this topic, the two approaches are highly inter-connected. We …rst consider the basic problem of the stability of the whole industry association of …rms under oligopoly and, for this purpose, we introduce the concept of core in games with externalities. We show that di¤erent assumptions on the behaviour as well as on the timing of the coalitions of …rms yield very di¤erent results on the set of allocations which are core-stable. We then consider the stability of associations of …rms organized in coalition structures di¤erent from the grand coalition. To this end, various coalition formation games recently introduced by the so called endogenous coalition formation literature are critically reviewed. Again, di¤erent assumptions concerning the timing and the behaviout of …rms are shown to yield a wide range of di¤erent results.
Introduction
Since the seminal work by Salant et al. (1983) on merger pro…tability, there has been a large interest in the stability of collusive agreements between …rms under oligopoly, as in the case of cartels and mergers (see, among the others, d 'Aspremont et al. 1982 , 1986 , Deneckere et al. 1985 , Donsimoni et al. 1986 , Rajan, 1989 and Huck et al. 2005 for a survey). A relevant number of the initial works on this topic has mainly focussed on the conditions under which a collusive agreement within one group of …rms can be viewed as stable when the remaining …rms in the industry act either as price-takers (d 'Aspremont et al., 1982 , Donsimoni et al., 1986 , among others) or as oligopolistic …rms (see Sha¤er, 1995) . As in the traditional price-leadership model (Markham, 1951) , in the above literature a group of dominant …rms is assumed to behave as one Stackelberg leader, i.e., taking as given the reaction of the remaining …rms in the fringe. Since in absence of synergies the cooperation within a cartel is formally equivalent to the outcome of a horizontal merger, many of the results of the horizontal merger literature (Salant et al.,1983 , Deneckere and Davidson, 1985 , Perry and Porter, 1985 , Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 , among others) also apply to the problem of cartel stability. 1 However, di¤erently from the cartel literature, most of the works on horizontal mergers examines the pro…tability of mergers in (oligopolistic) markets in which a group of collusive …rms and the fringe of competitors take their strategic decisions simultaneously.
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A common feature of both groups of contributions listed above is that the notion of stability usually adopted is one of individual stability: for a cartel (or merger) to be stable, no …rm of the fringe must have an incentive to enter the cartel (external stability) and no …rm of the cartel must possess an incentive to quit (internal stability). Recognizing the fact that this approach "...ignores the possibility that a group of players might jointly make themselves better o¤ by leaving the cartel (Shaked, 1986 )", later on some contributions have, in various ways, attempted to use a notion of coalition stability to approach the problem (see, for instance, d 'Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986 , Rajan, 1989 , Zhao, 1997 , Thoron, 1998) . The major purpose of these works is mainly to check whether some imputations exist under which a collusive agreement signed by all …rms in the industry is stable, that is, immune to deviations by every subcoalition of the …rms in the industry. As in the horizontal mergers literature, the stability of an agreement is examined in a context in which a deviating coalition and the remaining …rms of the industry act simultaneously. In such a literature, the sequential approach typical of the price-leadership model is thus lost. It may be questioned if the defection of a group of …rms from a cartel has to be viewed as happening before or at the same time the remaining …rms take their action. Indeed, it is often the case that a coalition of …rms deciding to leave the cartel and carry out its own collusive production, can choose such an action before its formation is publicly observed. In other terms, such a group can act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the outside …rms, that thus react to its action as followers. Clearly, the sequential structure is useful to describe only those situations in which a coalition of …rms can precommit to a joint strategy expecting outside …rms observing the e¤ects of its action, and being left with no choice but optimally reacting to it. In order to examine all these questions, we introduce in Section 2 the notion of core of games with externalities and thus apply it to check the stability of a merger or a cartel made by all …rms in the industry. We show that while the simultaneous approach to the cartel formation described above corresponds to the gamma-core or delta-core of an oligopolistic game (see, for instance Chander & Tulkens, 1998) , the sequential approach can be obtained by assuming a Stackelberg behaviour for all deviating coalitions (see Currarini & Marini, 2003) . In this way, we are able to see that some classical results on merger stability contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989) , can be easily extended. In particular, this author considers a linear and symmetric Cournot oligopoly with quadratic costs, and looks at the stability of cartels. In the case in which every deviation from a cartel implies that the remaining …rms stick togheter, the author is able to prove that, for n = 2; the game is convex and the core is non empty, while for n 3, the core is empty. Moreover, for n = 3 and n = 4; the only stable coalition structure is that in which every …rms act as singletons. However, when the deviation of a …rm from a cartel implies that remaining …rms split up in singletons, for n 3, the …rms never chose to stay separate and for n = 3 and n = 4;the core is non empty. In the terminology of cooperative games, Rajan (1989) makes use of the -core. We will show here that the set of allocations in the -core strictly contains those included in a sequential solution concept (here denoted -core). The possibility that the remaining …rms can observe the other …rms deviating from an agreement represents in such case a re…nement of the set of acceptable allocations of the joint surplus. Moreover, we prove that in the linear Cournot model, the -core comprehends a unique allocation. Obviously, the formation of collusive structures which are di¤erent from the whole association of …rms in the industry may also represent a serious options for …rms in oligopoly. The recent developments in the theory of endogenous coalition formation have, in this respect, provided a new set of game-theoretic tools to study this problem (Hurt and Kurz, 1983, Bloch, 1995, Ray and Vohra, 1997, Shin and Yi, 1997 and also Yi, 2003 , Bloch 1997 , Marini, 2008 , for surveys of this literature). In all these works, the cooperation (and, hence also the formation of an association of …rms) is modelled as a two stage process: at the …rst stage players form coalitions, while at the second stage formed coalitions interact in a well de…ned strategic setting. This process is formally described by a coalition formation game, in which a given rule of coalition formation maps players'intentions to form coalitions into a well de…ned coalition structure, which, in turn, determines the equilibrium strategies chosen by players at the second stage. A basic di¤erence among the various models lies in the timing assumed for the coalition formation game, which can either be simultaneous (Hurt & Kurz, 1983, Ray & Vohra,1997, Yi, 1997) or sequential (Bloch, 1994 , Ray & Vohra, 1999 . As far as the application to associations of …rms is concerned, Bloch, 1995 shows that in a linear Cournot oligopoly …rms may form in equilibrium an asymmetric association of …rms, comprising aproximately three-quarters of the …rms, while the remaining …rms stay as singletotns. We will show that this result is related to the well known Salant's et al., 1983 result on merger pro…tability. Finally, Ray and Vohra, 1997 show that there may also be a cyclical pattern in the formation of associations in a linear Cournot oligopoly. By using a recursive concept of solution -denoted equilibrium binding agreement -the authors prove that, for n = 2; there is a stable merger, while, for 3 n 8, any merger is unstable. Finally, for n = 9, the grand coalition forms and is stable. In Section 3 we will review some of these models and show that, when applied to the formation of collusive agreements, their results vary extensively according to the di¤erent assumptions made on the timing and the behaviour of …rms.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will be devoted to introduce a basic quantity oligopoly game adopted as underlying strategic form game in all coalitional equilibrium concepts introduced later on in the paper. Section 3 is concerned with the formation of the grand coalition of …rms and, for this reason, it reviews some classical coalitional concepts as the core, the strong Nash equilibrium and some variations of these two key solution concepts. Section 4 considers the stability of partial cartels and mergers and reviews some relevant approaches to the endogenous coalition formation problem. Section 5 brie ‡y concludes.
A Quantity Oligopoly Game
Let the pro…t function of every …rm i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng be de…ned as
where y i is the output of each …rm, y = P n i=1 y i the total industry output, p (y) the inverse demand function and C i (y i ) the cost function of every …rm. Let also C i (:) = C j (:), for every i,j in N . Thus, we can represent the Cournot oligopoly through the following strategic form game, G = (fY i ; i g i2N ; fY S g S N ). In such a game the set of players is represented by the set of …rms N and every …rm's strategy set is de…ned as
where y i is a capacity constraint. Let also players' preferences be linear in pro…t and, for every coalition of …rms S N , let the strategy set be represented by: In what follows we make the following standard assumptions:
The function i (:) and C i (:) are twice continously di¤erentiable for every i = 1; ::; n; A.2 For every i 2 N , the capacity constraint y i < 1 determines the maximum production level;
A.3 For every i 2 N , p 00 (:) y i + p 0 (:) < 0 and p 0 (:) C 00 i < 0.
There exists a unique (Nash) equilibrium of the game G.
Proof. By assumptions A.1, A.2 and A.3 every player's payo¤ functions is continuous in the strategy pro…le y N and strictly concave on y i . Strategy sets are non empty, compact and convex (y i y i < 1), so that existence of a Nash equilibrium follows. Uniqueness is proved as follows. By assumption A.3, the function (y i ; y) p 0 (y) y i + p (y) C 0 i (y i ) is decreasing 3 Since we limit ourselves to consider game in transferable utility, we want every strategy pro…le to de…ne exactly the payo¤ of a coalition of …rms. To this purpose we include the transfer in the de…nition of every coalition of …rms strategy set. 
Grand Coalition Stability
In this section we introduce the concept of core in games with externalities in order to check the stability of collusive agreements among …rms in an oligopolistic market. 
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The value v(S) can be interpreted as the maximal aggregate amount of utility members of coalition S can achieve by coordinating their strategies. However, in strategic environments players' payo¤s are de…ned on the strategies of all players and the worth of a group of players cannot be de…ned independently of the groups (or coalitions) formed by external players (N nS).
5 Hence, to obtain v(S) from a strategic situation we need …rst to de…ne an underlying strategic form game. In our case, the strategic form game will be represented by a standard Cournot oligopoly game.
3.2. -and -characteristic functions. The concepts of -and -core, formally studied by Aumann (1967) , are based on von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) early proposal of representing the worth of a coalition as the minmax or maxmin aggregate payo¤ that it can guarantee its members in the underlying strategic form game. Accordingly, the characteristic function v(S) in games with externalities can be obtained assuming that outside …rms act to minimize the payo¤ of every deviating coalition of …rms S N . In this minimax formulation, if members of S move second, the obtained characteristic function,
denoted -characteristic function, represents what …rms in S cannot be prevented from getting. Alternatively, if members of S move …rst, we have
denoted -characteristic function, which represents what …rms in S can guarantee themselves, when they expect a retaliatory behaviour from the complement coalition N nS. 6 When the underlying strategic form game G is zero-sum, (1) and (2) coincide. In non-zero sum games they can di¤er and, usually, v (S) < v (S) for all S N .
However, and characteristic functions express an irrational behaviour of coalitions of …rms, acting as if they expected their rivals to minimize their payo¤. Although appealing because immune from any ad hoc assumption on the reaction of the outside …rms (indeed, their minimizing behavior is here not meant to represent the expectation of S but rather as a mathematical way to determine the lower bound of S's aggregate payo¤), still this approach has important drawbacks: deviating coalitions are too heavily penalized, while outside …rms often end up bearing an extremely high cost in their attempt to hurt deviators. Moreover,the little pro…tability of coalitional objections usually yield very large set of solutions (e.g.,large cores).
Simultaneous Interaction among Coalitions: the -characteristic Function.
Another way to de…ne the characteristic function in games with externalities is to assume that in the event of a deviation from N , a coalition S plays à la Nash with the remaining …rms. 7 Similarly to the coalition formation game introduced by Hart and Kurz (1983), the -approach implicitly restricts the dynamic structure of deviations and reactions to the coalition formation stage, and treats the strategy choice stage as a simultaneous game given the coalition structure induced by the deviation. In other terms, in a …rst stage a coalition of …rms forms and remaining …rms react splitting up as singletons; in a second stage, optimal strategies are simultaneously chosen both by the deviating coalition of …rms and by the fringe of excluded …rms. Consequently, the strategy pro…le induced by the deviation of a coalition S N is precisely the Cournot equilibrium among S and each individual player in N nS. The worth of a cartel of …rms S under the assumption is thus its aggregate payo¤ in the Cournot equilibrium between S and the outside …rms acting as singletons. This is the setup implicitly underlying papers like Salant et al (1983) and Rajan (1989) to analyse the pro…tability of …rms'collusion. Thus, the characteristic function v (S) can be de…ned for all S N as:
Note that …rms outside S are treated as one coalition, so the implicit assumption here is that …rms in N nS stick together after S departure from the grand coalition N . 7 This way to de…ne the worth of a coalition in as a noncooperative equilibrium payo¤ of a game played between coalitions was …rstly proposed by Ichiishi (1983) . and 8j 2 N nS,
where y = (y 1 ; :::; y n ) is characterized by the following n …rst order conditions:
where,
In both cases, for (3.3) and (3.8) to be well de…ned, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic form game played among coalitions must be unique. Usually, v (S) < v (S) < v (S) for all S N .
Sequential Interactions among Coalitions: the -characteristic Function.
It is also conceivable to modify the -or -assumption (coalitions playing simultaneously à la Nash in the event of a deviation from the grand coalition) reintroducing the temporal structure typical of the and -assumptions. 8 When a deviating coalition S moves …rst under the -assumption, the members of S choose a coordinated strategy as leaders, thus anticipating the reaction of the players in N nS, who simultaneously choose their best response as singletons. The strategy pro…le associated with the deviation of a coalition S is thus the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game in which S is the leader and the players in N nS are, individually, the followers. We denote this strategy pro…le as a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S. Formally, this is the strategy pro…le e y (S) = (e y S ; y j (e y S )) such that (3.9) e y S = arg max
and, 8j 2 N nS,
We now establish conditions under which there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S. For every coalition of …rms S N and strategy pro…le y S 2 Y S , let G (N nS; y S ) denote the restriction of the game G to the set of …rms N nS, given the strategy pro…le y S .
Proposition 2. For every coalition of …rms S N there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S.
Proof. By condition (3.10) and proposition 1, the strategy pro…le fy j (y S )g j2N nS is the unique Nash equilibrium of G (N nS; y S ). By the closedness of the Nash equilibrium correspondence (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pag.30), members of S maximize a continuous function over a compact set (assumption 2); thus, by Weiestrass Theorem, a maximum exists.
Note that condition (3.9) implies that in every Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S the aggregate payo¤ of S is the same. We thus able to de…ne the joint payo¤ (or worth) of every coalition of …rms v (S) in the sequential case as uniquely de…ned as follows:
where (e y S ; y j (e y S )) is a Stackelberg equilibrium with respect to S and the vector (ỹ 1 ; :::;ỹ n ) is fully characterized by the following n …rst order conditions:
, for all j 2 N nS: where g( P i2Sỹ i ) is the Cournot Equilibrium strategy of each player in the game c (N nS;ỹ S ).
Obviously, v (S) v (S).
In a similar way, the -assumption can be modi…ed by assuming that a deviating coalition S plays as follower against all remaining players in N nS acting as singleton leaders. Obviously, the same can be done under the -assumption.
3.5. The Core in Games with Externalities. We can test the various conversions of v(S) introduced above by examining the di¤erent predictions obtained using the core of (N; v).
We …rst de…ne an imputation for (N; v) as a vector z 2 R n + such that
De…nition 3. The core of a TU cooperative game (N; v) is the set of all imputations z 2 R n + such that P i2S z i v(S) for all S N . 3.6. Some Results in a Linear Oligopoly. We …rst introduce a linear oligopoly, i.e., the case in which p (y) = a by and, for every …rm i 2 N , C i (y i ) = cy i . For every …rm i 2 N , let the cost function be:
The constraints on the parameters are:
a > c 0 and b > 0:
3.6.1. -and -core. Under the -and -assumptions, if either one single …rm or a group of …rms leave the grand coalition N , the remaining …rms will play a minimizing strategy in such a way that, for every S N , v (S) = v (S) = 0. In this case, the core coincides with all Pareto-e¢ cient imputations. The predictive power of the -and -core is thus minimal for the oligopoly games.
3.6.2. The -core. According to de…nition (3.3) the worth of a group of …rms S is given by:
In the linear case introduced above, this is equivalent to:
where, by the symmetry of …rms, y = sy i + (n s)y j .
The F.O.C. for coalition S is:
a 2by S b(n s)y j c = 0 from which, the best-reply function is:
Note that, if we consider separately the FOC for every i 2 S, we obtain the following best-reply function: By symmetry, every j's best -reply can be written as:
From the two best-replies (3.15) and (3.16) we get:
and, similarly:
Now, in order to obtain v (S) ; we …rst compute the equilibrium price:
and then, v (S) = X i2S i (y ) = S = p (y ) y S cy S that can be written as:
Proposition 3. Under the linear quantity oligopoly game, the -core is non empty and strictly includes the equal split allocation.
Proof. We know from (3.3) that
Without loss of generality let us normalize and v (S) = 1 (n s+2) 2 :Consider now the equal split allocation for a coalition of …rms S,
2 . Whatever distribution of the worth v (S) may be chosen by S, at least one player in S must get at most a payo¤ equal to 1 s(n s+2) 2 . This implies that coalition S improves upon the equal split allocation for N if and only if:
Straightforward calculations show that the above inequality is satis…ed respectively for:
and hence, it is never satis…ed for 1 < s n: It follows that the equal-split allocation for N characterized by the strategy vectors (y ; t ) ; where t = (0; 0; :::; 0) ; belongs to thecore. To see that this allocation is strictly included in the -core, note that, since individual deviations assign to a player just
; di¤erent and unequal allocations belong as well to the -core. In particular, any allocation giving to a player i his worth v (fig), and
to any remaining player in N , it is not objectable.
3.6.3. The -core. Using the same linear setup introduced above, the following result can be easily proved. , which is greater than
for n > 2, the maximum payo¤ that at least one …rm will obtain inside the grand coalition. Therefore, the core is empty.
3.6.4.
The sequential case and the -core. According to (3.11) , the worth of a coalition S in this case can be de…ned as:
As before, every j 2 N nS maximizes j ,for a given y S , and its best-reply is:
The coalition S acts as leader and maximizes:
This is equivalent to:
The F.O.C. of this problem is:
from which: Therefore, in order to obtain v (S) ; we …rst compute the equilibrium price:
p (e y) = a be y S b(n s)y j (e y S ) ; as:
p (e y) = a + 2 (n s) c + c 2 (n s + 1) :
Finally, v (S) = S (e y S ; (n s)y j (e y S )) = p (e y) e y S ce y S that is,
Again, the worth of the grand coalition (n = s) can be written as:
Proposition 5. For the linear quantity oligopoly, the equal split e¢ cient allocation is the unique element of the -core.
Proof. Without loss of generality let us normalize , where s = jSj and n = jN j. We …rst show that the equal split allocation belongs to the core. Consider the value
for an arbitrary coalition S. We have that for all S such that s n
In fact, the above inequality reduces to (3.24) (n s + 1) n which is satis…ed for n s. It follows that if coalition S forms, at least one player gets a payo¤ less than or equal to v (S) s , and therefore less than or equal to
. This implies that the equal split allocation is in the -core. To see that the equal-split is the unique allocation in the -core, note that (3.24) is satis…ed with equality for s = n and for s = 1. , which implies that z 0 is not in the -core.
The -core is non-empty and selects a unique symmetric allocation out of the -core, that includes instead a continuum of other asymmetric allocations. The -core can be therefore viewed as a re…nement of the -core, one that selects out of the latter the most "reasonable" allocation for the symmetric Cournot setting.
3.7. The case of linear demand and quadratic cost. We can now consider also the case with a quadratic cost function. As indicated above, we know from Rajan (1989) , that for n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4; the -core is non empty. We now show that this result does not hold under the -core assumption.
Let also for simplicity p (y) = a y:
Proposition 6. Under linear demand and quadratic cost quantity oligopoly, the -core can be empty.
Proof. From …rst order conditions, it is obtained that:
Simple calculations show that, for every i 2 N , and for n 2,
: By the e¢ ciency of the equal-split solution, in any other e¢ cient allocation at least one player would receive a lower utility. This fact together with the above result that any player can improve upon the equal-split allocation by deviating as singleton, imply that any e¢ cient allocation can be objected by a deviation of a single player. This, in turn, implies that the -core is empty.
Coalitional Equilibria in Strategic Form Games.
3.8.1. Strong Nash Equilibrium. In the 'core approach' described above, players can sign binding agreements. When this assumption is relaxed, a Nash approach to coalitional deviations becomes more appropriate. The concept of equilibrium proposed by Aumann (1959) , denoted strong Nash equilibrium, extends the Nash equilibrium to every coalitional deviation. Accordingly, a strong Nash equilibrium is de…ned as a strategy pro…le that no group of players can pro…tably object, given that remaining players are expected not to change their strategies.
A strategy pro…le b x 2 X N for G is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if there exists no S N and x S 2 X S such that
Obviously, all SNE of G are both Nash Equilibria and Pareto E¢ cient; in addition they satisfy the Nash stability requirement for each possible coalition. As a result, SNE fails to exist in many economic problems, and in particular, whenever Nash Equilibria fail to be Pareto E¢ cient. ; associated with the Paretoe¢ cient allocation, is not a Nash equilibrium, and the result follows.
Stable Associations of Firms

Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures.
According to the original spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), "the purpose of game theory is to determine everything can be said about coalitions between players, compensation between partners in every coalition, mergers or …ght between coalitions" (p.240). To introduce the topic of competition among coalitions, a framework di¤erent from which used by traditional cooperative games is required. The …rst required step is to extend the game (N; v) to a game with a coalition structure P = (S 1 ; S 2 ; ::::; S m ); i.e., a partition of players N such that for all S h ; S j 2 P , S h \ S j = ? and S k=1;2;::m S k = N . The second step is to de…ne the worth to every coalition belonging to a given coalition structure. Finally, a relevant issue is which coalition structure can be considered stable.
In their seminal contribution, Aumann and Drèze (1974) extend the solution concepts of cooperative game theory to games with exogenous coalition structures. In every P 2 P(N ), the set of all partitions of the N players, each coalition is allowed to distribute its members only its own worth v(S k ), here assumed equal to the Shapley value de…ned for every given coalition structure P 2 P.
9 However, the above restriction has been criticized as inadequate for all models in which "the raison d'etre for a coalition S to form is that its members try to receive more than v(S) -the worth of S." (Greenberg, 1994, p.1313) . A part from this criticism, the most commonly used stability concept within this framework is the coalition structure core. (N; v) be a cooperative game. The coalition structure P 2 P(N ) is stable if its core is nonempty, i.e., if there exists a feasible payo¤ z 2 Z(P ) such that, for every
De…nition 4. Let
The game (N; v) has a coalition structure core if there exists at least one partition that is stable.
4.1.1. The Partition Function Approach. The presence of externalities among coalitions of players calls for a more encompassing approach than that o¤ered by a cooperative games in characteristic function form. For this purpose, in a seminal paper Thrall and Lucas (1963) introduce the games in partition function form.
De…nition 5.
A TU game in partition function form can be de…ned as a triple (N ; P; w); where P = (S 1 ; S 2 ; ::::; S m ) is a partition of players N and w(S; P ) : 2 N P ! R is a mapping that assigns to each coalition S embedded in a given partition P 2 P(N ) a real number (a worth).
In this way, the authors can de…ne the value of every non-empty coalition S of N as v(S) = min f P jS2P g w(S; P ); where this minimum is over all partitions which contain S as a distinct coalition. This approach constitutes a generalization of the cooperative game (N ; v) and the two games coincides when the worth of a coalition is independent of the coalitions formed by the other players. When coaltions.payo¤s are not independent, some assumptions are still required to model the behaviour of coalitions with respect to rival.coalitions. Since Ichiishi (1983) , the modern theory of coalition formation adopts the view that coalitions cooperate inside and compete à la Nash with the other coalitions. 4.1.2. The Valution Approach. Since the games in partition function are hard to handle and often pose technical di¢ culties, many recent contributions have imposed a …xed allocation rule distributing the worth of a coalition to all its members. Such a …xed sharing rule gives rise to a per-member payo¤ (valuation) mapping coalition structures into vectors of individual payo¤s. 9 The Shapley value is de…ned as (N; v) = P S N q(s) i (s), where q(s) = De…nition 6. A game in valuation form can be de…ned as a triple (N; P; v i ), where P = (S 1 ; S 2 ; ::::; S m ) is a partition of players N and v i (S) : 2 N P ! R jSj is a mapping that assigns to each individual belonging to a coalition S embedded in a given partition P 2 P (the set of all feasible partitions) a real number (a valuation).
De…nition 7.
A coalition structure is core stable if there not exists a coalition S and a coalition structure P 0 such that for S 2 P 0 and for all i 2 S, v i (S; P 0 ) > v i (S; P ):
Analogous concepts of , , , , -core stability can be de…ned for games in valuation form. See the proposition that follows. Most recent contributions along these lines include Bloch (1995 Bloch ( , 1996 , Vohra (1997, 1999) and Yi (1997) . In all these works, cooperation is modelled as a two stage process: at the …rst stage players form coalitions, while at the second stage formed coalitions interact in a well de…ned strategic setting. This process is formally described by a coalition formation game, in which a given rule of coalition formation maps players'announcements of coalitions into a well de…ned coalition structure, which in turns determines the equilibrium strategies chosen by players at the second stage. A basic di¤erence among the various models lies on the timing assumed for the coalition formation game, which can either be simultaneous (Hurt & Kurz (1982) , Ray & Vohra (1994) , Yi (1997) ) or sequential (Bloch (1994) , Ray & Vohra (1995) Kurz (1983) were among the …rst to study games of coalition formation with a valuation in order to identify stable coalition structures. 10 As valuation, Hurt & Kurz adopt a general version of Owen value for TU games (Owen, 1977), i.e. a Shapley value with prior coalition structures, that they call Coalitional Shapley value, assigning to every coalition structure a payo¤ vector ' i (P ) in R N , such that (by the e¢ ciency axiom) P i2N ' i (P ) = v(N ). Given this valuation, the game of coalition formation is modelled as a game in which each player i 2 N announces a coalition S 3 i to which he would like to belong; for each pro…le = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S n ) of announcements, a partition P ( ) of N is assumed to be induced on the system. The rule according to which P ( ) originates from is obviously a crucial issue for the prediction of which coalitions will emerge in equilibrium. Hurt and Kurz's game predicts that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declared it (from which the name of "unanimity rule"also used to describe this game).
Formally:
P ( ) = fS i ( ) : i 2 N g where
Their game predicts instead that a coalition emerges if and only if all its members have declare the same coalition S (which may, in general, di¤ers from S). Formally: P ( ) = fS N : i; j 2 S if and only if S i = S j g . Note that the two rules of formation of coalitions are "exclusive" in the sense that each player of a forming coalition has announced a list of its members. Moreover, in the gammagame this list has to be approved unanimously by all coalition members. Once introduced these two games of coalition formation, a stable coalition structure for the game ( ) can be de…ned as a partition induced by a Strong Nash Equilibrium strategy pro…le of these games.
De…nition 8. The partition is a -stable ( -stable) coalition structure if = ( ) for some with the following property: there exists no S N and S 2 S such that
It can be seen that the two rules generate di¤erent partitions after a deviation by a coalition: in the -game, remaining players split up in singletons; in the -game, they stick together.
In the recent literature on endogenous coalition formation, the coalition formation game by Hurt and Kurz is usually modelled as a …rst stage of a game in which, at the second stage formed coalitions interact in some underlying strategic setting. The coalition formation rules are used to derive a valuation v i mapping from the set of all players'announcements into the set of real numbers. The payo¤ functions v i are obtained by associating with each partition P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g a game in strategic form played by coalitions G(P ) = (f1; 2; :::; mg ; (Y S 1 ; Y S 2 ; :::; Y Sm ); ( S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; Sm )); in which Y S k is the strategy set of coalition S k and S k : m k=1 Y S k ! R + is the payo¤ function of coalition S k , for all k = 1; 2; :::; m. The game G(P ) describes the interaction of coalitions after P has formed as a result of players announcements in .or -coalition formation games. The Nash equilibrium of the game G(P ) (assumed unique) gives the payo¤ of each coalition in P ; within coalitions, a …x distribution rule yields the payo¤s of individual members.
Following our previous assumptions (see section 1.2) we can derived the game G(P ) from the the strategic form game G by assuming that Y S k = Q i2S k Y i and S k = P i2S k i , for every coalition S k 2 P . We can also assume i = S k jS k j as the per capita payo¤ function of members of S k . Therefore, using the linear Cournot example for the -game we know that the payo¤ of each …rm i 2 S N when all remaining …rms split up in singletons, is given by:
where n jN j, s jSj and 0 = fSg i2S ; fN g i2N nS . We can thus present the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Under the linear oligopoly, the grand coalition induced by the pro…le = fN g i2N , is a stable coalition structure in the -game of coalition formation.
Proof. it can be easily veri…ed that the condition
2 s(n s + 2) 2 : holds for every s n and, therefore, the stability of the whole industry agreement holds under the linear oligopoly. 4.2.2. Sequential Games of Coalition Formation. Bloch (1996,1997) introduces a sequential coalition-formation game with in…nite horizon in which, as in Hurt and Kurz's (1988) -game, a coalition forms if and only if all its members have agreed to form the same coalition. The sequence of moves of the coalition formation game is organized as follows. At the beginning, the …rst player (according to a given ordering) makes a proposal for a coalition to form. Then, the player on his list with the smallest index accepts or rejects his proposal. If he accepts, it is the turn of the following player on the list to accept or reject. If all players on the list accept the …rst player's proposal, the coalition is formed and the remaining players continue the coalition formation game, starting with the player with the smallest index who thus makes a proposal to remaining players. If any of the players has rejected …rst player's proposal, the player who …rst rejected the proposal starts proposing another coalition. Once a coalition forms it cannot break apart or merge with another player or a coalition of players. Bloch (1996) shows that this game yields the same stationary subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure as a much simpler "size-announcement game", in which the …rst player announces the size of his coalition and the …rst s 1 players accept; then player i s 1 +1 proposes a size s 2 coalition and this is formed and so on, until the last player is reached. This equivalence is basically due to the ex ante symmetry of players. It can also shown that this size-announcement game possesses a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure.
If we the linear oligopoly with n > 2 …rms, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of Bloch's (1996) sequential game of coalition formation is a coalition structure P = (fSg ; fjg j2N nS ), with s = jSj equal to the …rst integer following 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2.
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The explanation is as follows. We know that when a merger of size s is formed in a Cournot market, the equal-split payo¤ of each …rm i 2 S in the merger is i (y (fSg ; fjg j2N nS )) = (a c) 2 =s (n s + 2) 2 which is greater than the usual Cournot pro…t i (y (fig i2N ) ) = (a c) 2 =s (n s + 1) 2 only for s > 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2. When a merger of size s is in place, each independent …rm outside the merger earns a higher pro…t than that of the members of the merger, equal to j (y (fSg ; fjg j2N nS )) = (a c) 2 = (n s + 2) 2 . Therefore, in the sequential game of coalition formation, the …rst …rms choose to remain independent and free-ride on the merger formed by subsequent …rms. When the number of remaining …rms is exactly equal to the Salant et al., 1983 minimal pro…table merger size s = 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2, they will choose to merge, as it is no longer pro…table to remain independent. 11 We know (Salant et al.,1983 ) that 2n + 3 p 4n + 5 =2.' 0:8n.
4.2.3.
Equilibrium Binding Agreement. Ray and Vohra (1997) propose a di¤erent stability concept. In this solution concept, players start from some coalition structure and are only allowed to break coalitions to smaller ones. The deviations can be unilateral or multilateral (i.e., several players can deviate together). The deviators take into account future deviations, both by members of their own coalitions and by members of other coalitions. Deviations to …ner partitions must be credible, i.e. stable themselves, and therefore the nature of the de…nition is recursive. We can start with a partition P and we can denote by B(P ) all coalition structures that are …ner than P . A coalition P 0 2 B(P ) can be induced from P if P 0 is formed by breaking a coalition in P . A coalition S is a perpetrator if it can induce P 0 2 B(P ) from P . Obviously, S is a subcoalition of a coalition in P . Denote the …nest coalition structure, such that jSj = 1 for all S, by P 0 . There are no deviations allowed from P 0 and therefore P 0 is by de…nition stable. Recursively, suppose that for some P , all stable coalitions were de…ned for all P 0 2 B(P ), i.e., for all coalition structures …ner than P . Now, we can say that a strategy pro…le (say a quantity pro…le of our oligopoly game) associated to a coalition structure y(P ) is sequentially blocked by y(P 0 ) for P 0 2 B(P ) if i) there exists a sequence fy(P 1 ); y(P 2 ); :::; y(P m )g with y(P 1 ) = y(P ) and y(P 0 ) = y(P m ); ii) for every j = 2; :::; m, there is a deviator S j that induces P j from P j 1 ; iii) y(P 0 ) is stable; iv) P j is not stable for any y(P j ) and 1 < j < m; v) i (y(P 0 )) > i (y(P j 1 )) for all i 2 S j and j = 2; :::; m.
De…nition 9. y(P ) is an equilibrium binding agreement if there is no y(P 0 ) for P 0 2 B(P ) that sequentially blocks y(P ) .
Applying the Equilibrium Binding Agreement to the linear oligopoly game with three …rms, we obtain that, beside y(P 0 ), with P 0 = (f1g : f2g ; f3g), which is by de…nition stable, also the grand coalition strategy pro…le y(P ) with P = (f1:2; 3g is an equilibrium binding agreement. For the n-…rm merger game, Ray and Vohra's show that there is a cyclical pattern, in which, depending on n, the grand coalition can or not be a stable coalition structure. For n = 3; 4; 5 it is stable, but not for n = 6; 7; 8. For n = 9 is again stable and so on, with a rather unpredictable pattern. "The grand coalition survives if there exist 'large zones of instability in intermediate coalition structures." (Ray & Vohra, 1997, p.73).
Concluding Remarks
This paper has quickly reviewed a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of both partial and full collusive agreements in oligopolistic markets. A number of illustrative results were presented to show that numerous connections exist between the Industrial Organization and Game Theory approaches on the subject, which may prove highly signi…cant and instructive for the future research agenda of both disciplines.
